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This paper studies the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on youth disconnection—i.e., the 
share of young people who were neither in school nor at work. Youth disconnection offers 
important advantages, relative to unemployment or participation rates, as a measure of the labor 
market for the most marginal and disadvantaged youth. Before the pandemic, approximately one 
out of eight young people between the ages of 18 and 24 were disconnected. The disconnection 
rate increased dramatically in April 2020 because of the pandemic; however, it has decreased 
quickly since that time. The increase in the disconnection rate at the beginning of the pandemic 
was mostly driven by a reduction in full-time work, but toward the end of 2020, the school 
enrollment rate also fell. Within-individual transition analysis reveals that the pandemic drove 
some individuals to disconnection, regardless of whether those persons were in school, at work, 
or already disconnected. Full-time workers saw the largest increase in transition to 
disconnection. Compared to the 2007 recession, the full-time-work to full-time-work transition 
decreased more and the full-time-work to disconnection transition increased more during this 
pandemic. 
JEL Classification Codes:  J13 
Key Words:  COVID-19, youth labor market, youth disconnection 
Acknowledgments:  We thank seminar participants at Jinan University and the W.E. Upjohn 
Institute for their helpful comments. We also thank Jing Cai for her help with the data analysis. 
All errors are our own. 
The term “disconnected youth,” also known as opportunity youth or NEET (“not in
education, employment, or training”), refers to those young adults who are disconnected from
school or the labor market. These young adults are less likely to accumulate human capital
than those who stay connected with school and the labor market, which can potentially
damage their long-term success. Youth disconnection has been an issue in the United States
for years. In 2019, approximately four million, or 13.8 percent, young adults between the
ages of 18 and 24 were reported to be neither in school nor at work. Disconnection rates are
higher among minorities: 19.3 percent for blacks and 15.2 percent for Hispanics.1
Economic downturns can disproportionately affect young people in negative ways and
exacerbate youth disconnection. Unemployment rates among young people rise during re-
cessions, often more than the unemployment rate among prime-aged adults (Hoynes et al.,
2012). The disconnection rate also rises during recessions. Frequently, the disconnection
rate moves together with the unemployment rate. Compared to the unemployment rate,
however, the disconnection rate can be a more relevant measure for young people because it
summarizes the labor market state for the age group that is the least attached to the labor
market and the least effective in terms of human capital accumulation. In particular, the un-
employment rate does not capture those youths who drop out of the labor force completely.
Disconnection is also different from labor force nonparticipation in that it takes school into
account. This distinction is important when measuring the status of the youth labor market
because a sizable share of young people are enrolled in school, and flows into schooling often
increase during recessions.
At the beginning of 2020, a deadly coronavirus, known as COVID-19, started to spread
across the world, stalling economic activities. To slow down the spread of the virus, state and
local governments have issued various social-distancing and stay-at-home orders, starting in
late March and early April 2020. Unemployment rates soared, and unemployment insurance
claims skyrocketed. This COVID-19 pandemic, as with any economic downturn, makes for
a particular challenging time for most young people. Timely analysis of the impact of the
1We excluded the data from June, July, and August when calculating these statistics.
1
pandemic on young adults can assist researchers and policymakers in understanding the
scope of the pandemic.
The Current Population Survey (CPS), though it has its limitations, is particularly useful
for this task. The CPS allows us to discuss the impact of the pandemic on youth disconnec-
tion using the cross-sectional feature of the data. More importantly, the panel structure of
the data allows us to link individuals over time and investigate within-individual changes.
The CPS tracks a person for four months after the person enters the survey; then, after an
eight-month break, the person is surveyed for another four months. We utilize this panel
structure to discuss how the pandemic changes individuals’ transitions, from the first to the
second four-month panel, among four mutually exclusive labor-market and school states of
being: 1) disconnection, 2) school, 3) part-time work, and 4) full-time work. This breakdown
reveals young people’s choices during the pandemic, conditional on their labor market status
in the prepandemic periods, and makes it possible to identify the groups that are affected
the most.
The four main results of the paper can be summarized as follows:
1) The disconnection rate increased dramatically from 13.4 percent in February 2020 to
25.3 percent in April 2020. That means that last April, one out of four young adults were
neither in school nor at work. The disconnection rate then gradually decreased after April.
2) The increase in the disconnection rate at the beginning of the pandemic was mostly
driven by a reduction in work, especially full-time work (more than 35 hours a week). School
enrollment rates barely changed at the beginning, but toward the end of 2020, school en-
rollment rates started to fall, which contributed to the persistence of the high disconnection
rate.2
3) Full-time jobs were hit the hardest in 2020, though this measure had mostly recovered
by the end of the year. The pandemic drove a proportion of individuals to disconnection,
regardless of whether those persons were in school, at work, or already disconnected, but
2At the time of this writing, newly released CPS data suggest that the disconnection rates remained
above 17 percent in the first three months of 2021. The school rate in March 2021 was at 45.7 percent, two
percentage points below the corresponding months for the previous three years.
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full-time workers saw the largest increase in transition to disconnection. Those who were
already in disconnection saw the smallest increase. Workers, especially part-time workers,
became more likely to go back to school during the pandemic than in the prepandemic period,
so schools provided an alternative option for young workers. Those who started out from
disconnection, however, did not seem to benefit from the school system, nor did we find an
increase in the school-to-school transition or persistence in schooling—that is, that a person
either stays in school longer or is more likely to pursue a more advanced degree.
(4) Compared to the 2007 recession, this pandemic has a larger impact on full-time
workers: we see a larger decline in the persistence in full-time work and a larger increase
in the transition from full-time work to disconnection during the pandemic.3 In addition,
during the 2007 recession, we see an increase in the transition from all four states to school,
but this pattern is not observed during this pandemic, though we do observe a large increase
in the transition from part-time work to school. The increase in school-to-school transition
that happened during the 2007 recession did not occur during the pandemic.
This paper contributes to the literature that evaluates the impact of COVID-19 on the
labor market. Since the onset of the pandemic, the unemployment rate, as well as unem-
ployment insurance claims, has increased dramatically. In April, when the economy started
to shut down because of the pandemic, the unemployment rate spiked at 14.7 percent, the
highest rate since 1948, according to a Bureau of Labor Statistic (BLS) news release.4 Some
researchers have shown that the negative effect is larger among young and low-wage workers
(Cortes and Forsythe, 2020). As the economy reopened, employment recovered slowly, but
younger people were among those who had the lowest reemployment rate (Cheng et al., 2020;
Chetty et al., 2020). This paper adds to the literature by providing a detailed analysis of
the impact on the youth labor market.
We also contribute to the literature on the youth labor market. Youth disconnection and
3We use the data between 2008 and 2010 to capture the impact of the 2007 recession—in other words,
we do not include the recovery period for this exercise. The prerecession transition matrix is estimated using
data between 2003 and 2006.
4See https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_05082020.htm.
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NEET have been important topics among researchers and policymakers around the world
(Belfield et al., 2012; ILO, 2020; Mascherini et al., 2012). Timely analysis of the impact of
the negative shock of the Covid-19 pandemic can be informative to policymakers to help
them understand the scope of the impact. Another relevant literature discusses the impact
of recession when young people enter the labor force (von Wachter, 2020). For example,
Kahn (2010) and Oreopoulos et al. (2012) show that the negative effects on the earnings
of young people who enter the labor market during a recession is long-lasting. While this
paper does not discuss the long-term impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, it does discuss the
extensive impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on young people and suggests that without
additional support, the impact could be enduring.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 1, we discuss our measure
for disconnection. Then we present our main results in Section 2, and we show how this
pandemic is different from the 2007 recession in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 discusses the
limitations of the study and concludes the paper.
1 Measuring youth disconnection during the pandemic
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey. In the CPS, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics collects information regarding an individual’s school and work status for
a reference week, usually the week that contains the 12th day of a month, so we know if
a person is enrolled in school or work for that week. Those who are in school or at work
are not disconnected, and we will discuss the impact of the pandemic on school and work
explicitly. Those who are unemployed or not in the labor force, conditional on not being in
school, are categorized as disconnected.
The categorization of those who have jobs but do not work in the CPS is more com-
plicated. One challenge that arises during the pandemic is that the CPS categorized a
proportion of unemployed as those who are employed but absent from work, so a clear
demarcation line between unemployed and “employed but does not work” is not available
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during the pandemic.5 People who were not able to work because of the pandemic but not
because of their own illness were supposed to be categorized as unemployed, but some inter-
viewers placed them in the “absent from work” category. In addition, a large share of the
“absence” category is assigned to “other reasons” for the question regarding “reasons for ab-
sence.” To maintain a consistent measure for disconnection, we categorized individuals who
had jobs but did not work for “other reasons” as disconnected. In addition, we categorized
those workers on vacation as disconnected, while the rest of the reasons were categorized as
nondisconnected. Table 1 provides a detailed description of our characterization.
Another challenge of using the CPS data during the Covid pandemic months is that the
response rate to the CPS interviews is lower compared to the previous years. The response
rate is much lower among those who were interviewed for the first time. The probability of
not responding to the survey is correlated with individual characteristics, such as income.
Because response rate is negatively associated with income, and young people from low-
income families are more likely to be disconnected, our estimated disconnection rate using
cross-sectional data could be downward biased. This potential bias is not possible to over-
come without detailed income data. Fortunately, the response rate recovered substantially
in September 2020, so the estimates are less subject to bias toward the recovery periods of
the pandemic.
In the analysis, we take advantage of the individual-level panel structure in the CPS and
investigate within-individual changes. This approach does not address the bias problem, but
among the individuals who were supposed to be reinterviewed, the response rates did not
drop as much as for the respondents who had just entered the sample. In the CPS, a sampled
individual is interviewed eight times: four consecutive months after being sampled (rounds
1 to 4); then the individual is out of the sample for eight months; after that, the person
is interviewed again for another four consecutive months (rounds 5 to 8). We restrict the
sample to individuals whose fifth-round interview started after April 2020, and we calculate
5See, for example, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/research-matters/2020/09/
pandemic-affect-survey-response.html.
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the probability of the people being interviewed at least once in 2020, conditional on being
interviewed in 2019. We use April as the starting point so that all the data points in 2020
are affected by the pandemic.
We report the probability of being reinterviewed from the 2019–2020 panel in Table 2
by age group, gender, and race. We also report the results from the 2018–2019 panel, for
comparison. The reinterviewed rate is lower in 2020 among those who were first interviewed
in 2019 than in 2019 among those were first interviewed in 2018, but the differences are not
as striking as the 10 percentage points that are reported in the cross-sectional data. Among
prime-aged individuals who were between 25 and 54 years old when entering the sample in
2019, 77.2 percent are reinterviewed in 2020. The number is 0.8 percentage points lower
compared to the 2018–2019 panel. Individuals who were between 18 and 24 when entering
the sample were less likely to be reinterviewed compared to prime-aged individuals. The
reinterviewed probability dropped by 2.1 percentage points in the 2019–2020 panel compared
to the 2018–2019 panel. The drop in the reinterviewed probability is similar across gender
and race.
The reinterviewed rate, however, is still low, and it is lower when compared to the panel
from the previous year because of the pandemic. In the within-individual analysis in Section
2.3, we treat “not reinterviewed” as a stand-alone destination state when discussing how
young people transitioned from the four states we examined—1) school, 2) part-time work,
3) full-time work, and 4) disconnection.
Before we discuss the results, it is worth mentioning that a cross-sectional measure of the
disconnection rate represents two groups of young people—1) those who are transitioning in
and out of the state of disconnection and 2) those who are staying in disconnection for long
periods of time. Using the panel structure of the CPS, we find that among those who were
disconnected for at least one month in the 2018–2019 panel, 28 percent spent more than 75
percent of the observed time in disconnection. In other words, a disconnection rate reflects
a large proportion of young people who do not have a stable career and transition in and
6
out of disconnection.6
2 The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on youth
disconnection
In this section, we start by presenting the overall impact of COVID-19 on individuals
between the ages of 18 and 24 years. Then we discuss the differential impact across de-
mographic groups. Finally, we utilize the panel structure of the CPS data to investigate
within-individual changes.
2.1 Overall impact on youth labor market
Since the beginning of the pandemic, researchers have been following its impact on the
labor market closely. Here, we start by analyzing two standard measures of the labor market
and investigate how the pandemic affects young adults and prime-aged people differently.
One central measure researchers rely on when studying labor market issues is the unemploy-
ment rate. Figure 1, Panel A, shows the trends of the unemployment rate for young adults
and prime-aged individuals from January 2019 to December 2020. In 2019, the average
unemployment rate among prime-aged individuals between 25 and 54 was 3.1 percent. For
young people between 18 and 24, the average unemployment rate in 2019 is higher, at 7.9
percent. The unemployment rate increased dramatically in April 2020, when the pandemic
started. The unemployment rate among prime-aged individuals increased from 3.4 percent
in February to 12.8 percent in April, and the unemployment rate among young people rose
from 7.8 percent in February to 26.8 percent in April. During this time, the impact of
the pandemic on the unemployment rate was larger for young people in percentage-point
changes. In both cases, the unemployment rate dropped steadily after April. In December,
the unemployment rate remained higher compared to the corresponding month in the pre-
6Chen et al. (2020) show a similar result using panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1997. They further reveal that those who constantly transition in and out of a state of disconnection
tend to hold low-wage and high-turnover jobs.
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vious year: 4.3 percentage points higher for young people and 2.9 percentage points higher
for prime-aged people.
Another key measure researchers rely on is the labor force participation rate (LFPR),
which we report in Panel B of Figure 1. LFPR is higher among prime-aged individuals than
among young people, because some young people are in school. In 2019, the average LFPR
was 82.7 percent among the prime-aged and 65.7 percent among the young. The COVID-19
pandemic negatively affected the LFPR for both groups. The impact is, however, smaller
for the prime-aged individuals at the beginning: for this group, the LFPR dropped slightly
from 83.0 percent in February to 79.7 percent in April, then it increased and remained over
80 percent thereafter. For young people, the LFPR dropped from 65.1 percent in February
to 56.8 in April. Compared to April 2019, the LFPR was 7.0 percentage points lower in
April 2020. The difference in the corresponding months between 2019 and 2020 then shrank
gradually and closed in December, but the LFPR among the prime-aged is still lower for
that month compared to December 2019.
When constructing the unemployment rate statistics in Figure 1, we count only those who
are categorized as unemployed by the CPS data. As mentioned earlier, the unemployment
rate is not consistently defined in the CPS data during the pandemic. The disconnection
measure we use takes care of this inconsistency. The unemployment rate also does not
distinguish the unemployment of those who are enrolled in school from that of those who are
not, although these two states may be different for young people in terms of human capital
accumulation. Similarly, the LFPR for young people does not carry the same meaning as for
the prime-aged, because young people have the option of being in the labor force, or school, or
both. For example, the decline in LFPR that we observed in April could simply be an artifact
of young people going back to school. In this case, the implication of the declining LFPR
is different from a decline in the LFPR among prime-aged individuals. Therefore, neither
unemployment nor LFPR provides a full picture regarding outcomes for young people. The
disconnection rate is a useful complement to those two measures, which only consider the
labor market status.
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The disconnection rate, following the trends in the unemployment rate during the pan-
demic, increased dramatically, from 13.4 percent in February to 25.3 percent in April (Panel
A of Figure 2). The number of disconnected young people increased from 3.9 million in
February to 4.3 million in April. Compared to April 2018 and April 2019, the disconnection
rate is approximately 10 percentage points higher. The difference kept shrinking over time.
The disconnection rate is mechanically higher during summer months, when young people
who enrolled in school are on summer vacation. To net out the impact of the pandemic, we
regress the disconnection rate on dummy variables for month (γm) and year (δy), and then
on a set of indicators for months in 2020 (I(month = t) ∗ I(year = 2020)):
DRmy = α0 + γm + δy + Σ
t=12
t=2 αt−1I(month = t) ∗ I(year = 2020) + εmy. (1)
Panel B of Figure 2 plots the coefficients on the interaction terms, which represent the
seasonally adjusted impact of the pandemic.7 For this analysis, we use the data from 2015
to 2019, as in Cortes and Forsythe (2020). This figure suggests that the disconnection rate
increased in April by more than 10 percentage points and then fell gradually. Starting in
October, it rebounded slightly.
To provide a more complete picture of the impact on young people, we examined the
changes in school and work. Panel A of Figure 3 plots the share of people enrolled in school
or training programs.8 There is evidence that young people use school to shield themselves
against bad labor-market shocks. During this pandemic, however, the school rate barely
changed, except for a temporary increase during the summertime. In fact, the school rate
started to fall after September 2020.
In Panel B, we plot the trends in work and further categorize the work types as part-time
(< 35 hours/week) and full-time (≥ 35 hours/week) work. The share of young people who
7The disconnection rate is weighted by the monthly sample weight.
8We construct four mutually exclusive states: 1) full-time work, 2) school, 3) part-time work, and 4)
disconnection. In the case of ties, we use the following ordering: full-time work > school > part-time work
> disconnection.
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worked part time barely changed over this time period.9 The percentage of young adults
who were employed part time fell moderately in April and then started to increase gradually
afterward. Full-time workers, however, did not follow the same trend. After accounting for
seasonality, the percentage of young people working full time dropped by 11.2 percentage
points from February to April—with the actual share dropping from 33 percent in February
to 22 percent in April—and stayed low during the summer and early fall. The full-time
workers then started to recover in October. Because of the difference in the trends between
part-time and full-time work, we consider them as two different states when we investigate
within-individual changes in Section 2.3.
In summary, Figure 3 suggests that the increase in the disconnection rate at the beginning
of the pandemic was mostly driven by a reduction in full-time work—those who worked 35
hours a week or more. Toward the end of 2020, the drop in the school rate played an
important role.
2.2 The impact of the pandemic across demographic groups, states,
and industries
Before we present the results for within-individual transitions, we will briefly discuss the
impact of the pandemic across demographic groups. In Panels A and B of Figure 4, we plot
the impact of the pandemic across gender and race. The trends of the impact are similar
across these groups, but the pandemic, on average, had a larger negative effect on minorities.
For males, the pandemic increased the disconnection rate for blacks and Hispanics by 18.7
and 14.7 percentage points in April relative to February, but the number is smaller among
white males, at 11.7 percentage points. By December 2020, the disconnection rate had
fallen to only a few percentage points higher than in nonpandemic times; also, black males
recovered faster than the other two groups. The impact of the pandemic on females was
slightly different: In April 2020, the disconnection rate increased by 18.2, 12.6, and 10.8
9Note that those who are in school and work part time at the same time are categorized to be in school,
so this share captures those who work part time, conditional on not being in school.
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percentage points, respectively, for black, Hispanic, and white females. By the end of 2020,
the disconnection rate had recovered fully for white females, but for minority females it was
still a few percentage points higher, compared to the prepandemic period.
Panel C of Figure 4 shows the trends for different age groups. This figure suggests that
the impact increases with age. One explanation for this pattern is that young people are less
likely to be in school when they grow older, and they become more vulnerable to bad labor
market shocks when they are in the process of transitioning from school to labor market. In
this sense, schools provided a certain level of protection for young people who were enrolled
and prevented them from being disconnected.
Next, we explore the impact across different states. In Figure 5, we plot a map for the
change in the disconnection rate for each state.10 Compared to 2019, the disconnection
rate increased in most of the states. Among all states, Nevada saw the largest increase in
the disconnection rate. Considering the industry composition in Nevada, this observation
suggests that industry composition can play a major role in driving the disconnection rate.
To explore the differential impact across industries further, Figure A2 plots the percentage
change in employment by major industry categories. Entertainment and recreation services
experienced the largest decline, followed by personal services, eating, drinking, and lodging
places. This is not surprising, because the social-distancing and stay-at-home policies affect
mostly “nonessential” service sectors that require interpersonal interactions. By comparison,
employment loss in the retail sector was relatively mild, because many establishments in retail
were considered to be essential.
2.3 Transitions among disconnection, school, and work
In this section, we investigate how young people transition among different educational
and labor market states. Based on the discussion in Section 2.1, four states are of interest: 1)
disconnection, 2) school, 3) part-time work, and 4) full-time work. In addition, we investigate
10Figure A1 plots the disconnection rate for all states in 2019 for the sake of comparison. In both cases,
we use data between January and December, but leaving out the summer months.
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the transition to “not interviewed” because a fairly large number of young people were not
interviewed in 2020 after they were interviewed in 2019. In this “not interviewed” category,
we also count those whose work, school, or disconnection status is not determined. These
two conditions are summarized into a “missing” category. Using the four-eight-four panel
structure of the CPS, we estimate the probability of the transitions from one’s state in 2019
to one’s state in 2020, and we use the estimates from the 2018–2019 panel for comparison.
To capture the individuals who were surveyed during the COVID months that started
in April, we restricted the sample to those respondents whose scheduled fifth-round survey
happened after April 2020, so that all the individuals in the sample were treated.11 The
five states that we considered—1) missing, 2) part-time work, 3) full-time work, 4) school,
and 5) disconnected—are mutually exclusive. We defined an individual’s state in the first
four-month and second four-month panels using the individual’s predominant activity—that
is, what the person was doing during most of the observed time. For example, if a person
was observed three times in the 2019 four-month panel, and the person was in school for two
months and worked full time for one month, then the person is defined to be in school. This
measure is not perfect, but it allows us to preserve as many observations as possible. In the
case of ties among the nonmissing values, we use the following ordering: full-time work >
school > part-time work > disconnection. For example, if a person worked part-time and
was in school in the same month, we assign the person to school. Similarly, if a person
worked part time for two months and worked full time for another two months, then the
person is assigned to full-time work.
We estimate a multinomial logit model. The latent utility of individual i in year t and
in state j ∈ J = {full-time work, school, part-time work, disconnection, missing} is given by
yijt = Σk∈KδkjI(yi(t−1) = k) +Xiβj + εijt. (2)
11We conditioned the sample on those who were observed at least once in the first four rounds. Also note
that because in March 2020 the survey week is the week of the eighth, and that this was before the states
started to close down, the March survey did not capture most of the changes in that month.
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Individuals choose the state in year t to maximize utility. To investigate the transition
from the previous states, a key explanatory variable is the state in the previous year t − 1,
I(yi(t−1) = k). Because we restricted the sample to those who were interviewed at least
once during the first four months, k ∈ K = {full-time work, school, part-time work, discon-
nection}. In the analysis, we include dummy variables for male, black, and Hispanic, and
they are represented by Xi. The exponential of the δ coefficients provides estimates for the
key results of interest: compared to those who were in a predetermined base state in period
t−1, what is the odds ratio of being in state j relative to the base state in period t, were the
person in state k in period t− 1? Interpreting the odds ratio results is, however, difficult, so
we will report the marginal effect instead.
The error term εijt is assumed to be i.i.d. and extreme value type-I distributed. The
probability of individual i being in state j can be written as:
P (yit = j|yi(t−1) = k,Xi) =
eδkj+Xiβj
1 + Σl 6=baseeδkl+Xiβl
. (3)
We estimate the model and report the transition probability in Table 3. The transition
probabilities are evaluated at the mean of the covariates.12 Panel A reports the results for
the 2018–2019 panel, which is the prepandemic panel. The rows represent starting states,
and the columns represent destination states. The numbers show, among those individuals
who were in a given starting state, what percentage are predicted to end up in each of the
destination states. The numbers in the same row add up to one by construction.
Table 2 has shown that approximately 40 percent of young people between 18 and 24 were
not reinterviewed. The estimation results further reveal that among the four starting states,
those who were in school in 2018 had the lowest nonresponse rate in 2019, at 31.1 percent.
There is no perfect way to overcome the data attrition problem, so we explicitly estimate
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the data attrition. Compared to the 2018–2019
12In the estimation, we set school to be the base state. Choosing a different base state does not affect
results, but it affects the interpretation if odds ratio results are reported. In this case, however, because we
report the marginal effects, the interpretation is unaffected. Table A1 reports the raw transition matrix for
the sake of comparison.
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panel, the nonresponse rate increased by 0.2–3.7 percentage points across the four starting
states (Panel C). This increase was inevitable and expected because interviewing was more
challenging during the pandemic compared to the prepandemic period. When interpreting
the other results, this situation needs to be taken into account.13
With the caveat of data attrition in mind, we continue to discuss the transitions among
the other states. Among those who were disconnected in 2018, 33.2 percent remained discon-
nected in the 2019 survey. This share is larger than the other three nonmissing destination
states combined, suggesting that disconnection is persistent.14 Other than those with dis-
connection or those not interviewed, 12.0 percent transitioned to full-time work, 8.1 percent
to school, and 5.7 percent to part-time work. The pandemic increased the transition to dis-
connection by 7.4 percent and reduced the transition to the other three nonmissing states.
Almost all the reduction in transitions to either type of work maps to the increase in tran-
sition to disconnection.
Among those who were in school in 2018, 43.7 percent remained in school in 2019, the
largest among the four nonmissing categories. This pattern reflects mostly the feature of the
school system: it takes multiple years to acquire a diploma or a degree. The second-largest
category is full-time work, 14.4 percent. This shows that among those who leave the school
system, a large share ended up working full time, compared to the 5.9 percent that ended up
in disconnection and the 4.9 percent that ended up with a part-time position. The pandemic
has a small effect on the transition to part-time work, with a drop of 0.1 percentage points,
but its impact on the transition to full-time work is larger, at 4.0 percentage points. In
other words, among those who left school right before or during the pandemic, a smaller
share could find a full-time job compared to previous years. This finding suggests that the
13The increase in the nonresponse rate can affect our estimates in the four-by-four matrix that excludes
the missing state, but we argue that the impact will not be large. If we distribute the percentage points to
the nonmissing states, it will not change the main observations that we discuss in this table.
14In this paper, we do not explore the source of the persistence, but two possible reasons can explain
that persistence. One reason is that an individual has a preference toward disconnection: those who enter
the disconnection state value leisure time or flexibility in working schedules more than others. Another
reason is that other forces, in particular negative labor market shocks, drive these people into the state of
disconnection and keep them there. These two reasons have different policy implications, but distinguishing
between these two reasons is beyond the scope of the paper.
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pandemic has a negative impact on the cohort who entered the labor force in 2020.
For those who started out with part-time work in 2018, 29.3 percent transitioned to
full-time work, followed by 20.3 percent to part-time work, 7.7 percent to disconnection,
and 5.9 percent to school. The pandemic increased the transition to disconnection and to
school, while reducing the transition to both types of work. The reduction in the transition
to full-time work is larger than the transition to part-time work, 43.3 percent versus 12.8
percent.
Compared to those who started out from part-time work in 2018, those who started out
from full-time work were much more likely to remain in full-time work (48.0 percent) in 2019,
and much less likely to transition to part-time jobs (3.6 percent). Approximately 5.3 percent
of the individuals transitioned from full-time work to school; this number is similar to those
who transitioned to school from part-time work. The pandemic increased the transition
from full-time work to disconnection, and it reduced the transition from full-time work to
full-time work. Part of the reduction in full-time work, however, contributed to an increase
in part-time work. The transition from full-time work to part-time work increased by 0.8
percentage points, or 21.0 percent. In contrast, those who transitioned from part-time work
experienced declines in both part-time and full-time work because of the pandemic. The
difference suggests that although we only see a transitory dip in employment in part-time
jobs, the composition of workers who work part time could have changed.
The pandemic reduces the school-school transition by 0.3 percentage points, but at the
same time, we observe an increase in the transition from both types of work to school.
Schools are usually considered to provide a shield against negative labor market shocks, and
students tend to stay in school longer during recessions (Stange, 2012). This time, though,
we do not observe an aggregate increase in school enrollment rate; rather, workers seemed to
fall back on the school system when job opportunities shrank. Those who were disconnected
or those who were already in school did not seem to take advantage of the school option.
In summary, the pandemic drove a proportion of individuals from all four starting states
to disconnection. In percentage terms, full-time workers saw the largest increase in the
15
transition into disconnection: only 3.2 percent of individuals working full-time in 2018 tran-
sitioned to disconnection in 2019, but this percentage more than doubled in the following
year. The impact of the pandemic on those who were already in disconnection appeared to
be small, as the transition to disconnection increased by only 7.4 percent.
Full-time workers also experienced an increase in the transition from full-time work to
part-time work, while part-time workers experienced declines in both types of jobs. Both
types of workers became more likely to go back school during the pandemic compared to the
prepandemic time, so school seemed to provide some level of protection for young workers.15
Those who started out from disconnection did not seem to benefit from the opportunities
the school systems offered.
3 Is this time different?
As with any recession, the pandemic increased the unemployment rate dramatically, but
it is also fundamentally different from any of the previous recessions in terms of the speed
of its development and the industries that were affected. Individuals’ labor supply choices
were also affected, because workers were facing greater health risks during the pandemic. In
this section, we discuss what this difference means for the youth labor market by comparing
this pandemic with the 2007 recession.
In Figure 6, we plot the trends for the share of youth aged 18 to 24 years who are
disconnected, in school, or at work.16 Panel A shows that the trends in disconnection rate
almost overlap with the national unemployment rate: the disconnection rate is higher during
economic recessions and lower during booms. During the 2007 recession, the disconnection
rate increased from 15.4 percent in 2006 to 19.1 percent in 2010—its highest level. The
largest annual increase, 2.3 percentage points, happened from 2008 to 2009, which overlapped
15A large share of young people who enrolled in school also work part-time. When we break down the
part-time work category by part-time workers who are enrolled and those who are not, we find an increase
in the transition into school for both categories. This observation suggests that the part-time young workers
who are not attached to school also took advantage of the school system when job opportunities shrank.
16We average the rates across months within each year. When calculating the shares for disconnection,
work, and school, we dropped the observations in June, July, and August.
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with the largest increase in the unemployment rate. The disconnection rate then declined
gradually after 2010 as the economy recovered from the recession.
As in this pandemic, the increase in the disconnection rate during the 2007 recession was
mostly driven by the reduction in work. From 2006 to 2010, the share of young people at
work dropped from 61.5 percent to 52.7 percent, and the level of working young adults never
recovered to the prerecession level. The share of young people in school increased over the
past three decades, with a slightly steeper increase during the recession.
Unlike the 2020 pandemic, the 2007 recession affected young men and young women
differently. Figure 7 plots the trends in disconnection by gender. The trends for males
overlap with the trends for the national unemployment rate. The trends are different for
females. The disconnection rate among females is on average higher than the disconnection
rate for males, although it dropped from approximately 24 percent in early 1990 to 18 percent
in early 2000. Surprisingly, the 2007 recession had only a small impact on the disconnection
rate among females, though the share of females who worked dropped.17
In Figure A4, we plot the trends for the share of individuals in school and at work by
gender. The percentage of young men and young women at work dropped during the 2007
recession, but the decline from 2006 to 2010 is slightly larger for males than for females, 11.5
percentage points versus 5.9 percentage points. The percentage of young men in school had
been increasing since the early 1990s, but the increase was faster during the 2007 recession.
By comparison, this pattern of a faster increase in school rate is not observed among females.
This suggests that young men are more likely to take advantage of the school system during
a recession. In this pandemic, however, we did not observe an increase in the school rate
among young men.
In Figure A5, we plot the percentage change in employment by industry. We use data
from 2006 and 2010 when calculating these changes. This figure can partially explain the
gender differences in the disconnection rate we see in the 2007 recession. Comparing the
17Figure A3 further breaks down the data by race. The pattern in which the disconnection rate among
young males increased while the disconnection rate among young females barely increased during the 2007
recession holds across race groups.
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impact of the pandemic and the recession across industries, the industries that saw the
largest reduction in employment during the pandemic—entertainment and recreation services
and eating, drinking, and lodging places—experienced employment growth during the 2007
recession. In the 2007 recession, the decline is largest in construction and manufacturing of
durable goods, and a majority of workers in these industries are male. These two observations
are consistent with the fact that males were more responsive during the 2007 recession.
Finally, Panel B of Table 3 reports the transition probabilities before the 2007 recession,
and Panel D shows the impact of the 2007 recession.18 We highlight two observations
regarding full-time work and schooling, which are two states that we consider to be better
than the others in terms of human capital accumulation.
First, in both cases, we see an increase in the transition from all states to disconnection
and a decrease in the transition from all states to full-time work. The impact on full-
time work is larger this time than the 2007 recession: the full-time to full-time transition
decreased more, and the full-time work to disconnection transition increased more during
this pandemic. Toward the end of 2020, full-time employment had greatly recovered. How
this large decline in full-time work affected young people in the longer run is worth exploring,
but we do not have sufficient data to answer the question now.
Second, during the 2007 recession, we saw an increase in the transition from all states
to school, but this is not what we observed during this pandemic. In particular, during the
2007 recession, we noticed an increase in school-to-school transition—that is, young people
stayed in school longer, or they chose to pursue a higher degree. This increase in school-
to-school transition is not observed during the pandemic. One explanation for the lack of
school-to-school transition is that the online courses, compared to in-person instruction, are
18We use the data between 2008 and 2010 for Panel D to capture the developing period of the 2007
recession, not the recovery period. The pandemic developed very quickly. Though the recovery, as indicated
by measures such as unemployment rate and disconnection rate, also happened fast, we still consider our
analysis as having captured the short-run effect of the pandemic. For young people, the impact can linger for
longer periods. For example, those who were supposed to be transitioning from school to the labor market
in 2020 may have experienced delays in finding a job. This type of adjustment takes time to resolve. We
think, therefore, that the current transition results are more likely to capture the short-run impact of the
pandemic and are more comparable to the developing period of the recession.
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less attractive to those who are already enrolled. It is also likely that the development of
the pandemic happened so quickly that young people were not able to adjust, or that they
expected it to be a short-term event, so that adjusting their plans for it was not necessary.
Further research is needed to evaluate these explanations.
4 Discussion and limitations
The COVID-19 pandemic has negatively affected young people. More young people
stayed disconnected from the labor market or school. Compared to prime-aged individuals,
young people are more vulnerable to economic downturns, and importantly, the impact of
such downturns could be long-lasting for young adults and might negatively affect their
lifetime earnings.
This paper does not provide a conclusive answer to the impact of the pandemic on young
people, as we are still in the middle of the pandemic. Beyond the outcomes measured by
this paper, young people who are in school could also be negatively affected from online-only
instruction. Online instruction may not be a perfect substitute for in-person instruction, and
occasional switches between online and in-person learning can make students’ lives even more
challenging. Young entrepreneurs may also find it very challenging to help their businesses
survive the pandemic. These young people who experienced this unexpected downturn will
need additional support to resume their original plans.
Finally, we discuss two limitations of the paper. First, the CPS data do not allow us
to follow an individual for more than 16 months, so evaluating the long-run impact of the
pandemic on youths’ labor market outcomes requires other data sets.
Second, the CPS only allows us to observe reported work—and, oftentimes, formal work.
Disconnected youth, however, can be involved in occasional paid alternative work arrange-
ments that they do not report unless they are specifically asked to do so. For example,
according to the data from the 2019 Survey of Household Economics and Decision Making,
among those who were disconnected based on a similar definition as in the CPS, 25.1 percent
19
reported that they were paid for performing some tasks.19 Because of the data limitations
in the CPS, we are not able to capture these alternative work arrangements in the analysis.
19For example, 13.9 percent reported that they earned some income from work related to house cleaning,
yard work, or other property maintenance work; 8.4 percent completed some paid tasks online, such as
freelance work through Fiverr or Upwork; 7.3 percent helped with dog walking, feeding pets, or house
sitting; 1.8 percent provided child or elder care services; and 1.8 percent provided driving or ride-sharing
services such as Uber or Lyft. The statistics are based on 584 individuals between 18 and 24 years old. The
estimated disconnection rate is 13.6 percent, similar to the estimate in the CPS.
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NOTE: This table clarifies the definition of disconnection used in the paper. The categories correspond to the categories given in the CPS.
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Table 2: Probability of Being Reinterviewed
Panel A: Full Sample Panel B: Aged 18–24
Age group Gender Race 2018–2019 2019–2020 Difference 2018–2019 2019–2020 Difference
(p.p) (p.p)
Age 18–24 64.9% 62.8% -2.1%
Age 25–54 78.0% 77.2% -0.8%
Male 79.1% 78.5% -0.6% 66.6% 64.3% -2.3%
Female 79.6% 79.2% -0.4% 63.1% 61.2% -1.9%
White 81.2% 80.5% -0.7% 63.9% 61.4% -2.5%
Black 74.5% 74.4% -0.1% 66.4% 63.8% -2.6%
Hispanic 75.6% 75.6% 0.0% 66.3% 65.0% -1.2%
Asian 80.0% 78.8% -1.2% 68.5% 66.2% -2.2%
Other 74.9% 74.6% -0.3% 63.3% 64.8% 1.5%
NOTE: This table reports the probabilities of being reinterviewed in the 2019–2020 panel, and the probabilities are then compared
with the 2018–2019 panel. Panel A is based on the full sample, and then the data is broken down by age group, gender, and
race. Panel B is restricted to individuals who are between 18 and 24 when entering the sample. See text for details regarding the
sample used in this table.
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Table 3: Transition Matrix from the Multinomial Logit Regressions Comparing the Pandemic and the 2007 Recession
Panel A: 2018–2019 Panel B: 2003–2006
Disconn. PT Work School FT Work Missing Disconn. PT Work School FT Work Missing
Disconn. 0.332 0.057 0.081 0.120 0.410 Disconn. 0.216 0.057 0.063 0.137 0.527
(0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
School 0.059 0.049 0.437 0.144 0.311 School 0.043 0.045 0.410 0.138 0.364
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
PT Work 0.077 0.203 0.059 0.293 0.368 PT Work 0.064 0.161 0.068 0.244 0.463
(0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.017) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
FT Work 0.032 0.036 0.053 0.480 0.399 FT Work 0.028 0.038 0.045 0.435 0.454
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Panel C: 2019–2020 (Difference; p.p./percent) Panel D: 2008–2010 (Difference; p.p./percent)
Disconn. PT Work School FT Work Missing Disconn. PT Work School FT Work Missing
Disconn. 0.024 -0.010 -0.005 -0.011 0.002 Disconn. 0.04 0.014 0.011 -0.027 -0.037
7.4% -17.6% -6.2% -9.4% 0.5% 18.5% 24.6% 17.5% -19.7% -7.0%
School 0.019 -0.001 -0.003 -0.040 0.026 School 0.017 0.007 0.041 -0.027 -0.039
32.6% -2.5% -0.7% -27.8% 8.4% 39.5% 15.6% 10.0% -19.6% -10.7%
PT Work 0.055 -0.026 0.061 -0.127 0.037 PT Work 0.021 0.044 0.018 -0.035 -0.047
72.0% -12.8% 102.4% -43.3% 9.9% 32.8% 27.3% 26.5% -14.3% -10.2%
FT Work 0.039 0.008 0.008 -0.068 0.013 FT Work 0.011 0.014 0.008 -0.005 -0.027
124.3% 21.0% 14.2% -14.1% 3.3% 39.3% 36.8% 17.8% -1.1% -5.9%
NOTE: This table reports the estimated transition probabilities. The rows represent the starting states, and the columns represent
the destination states. For Panel A and Panel B, the numbers in each row add up to one. The missing category includes those
respondents who were not reinterviewed and those respondents whose status was undetermined. Panel C and Panel D report
the change in the transition probabilities. Percentage point changes are reported in black, and percentage changes are in blue.
Delta-method-calculated standard errors are in parentheses.
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Young People 2019 Prime Age 2019
Young People 2020 Prime Age 2020
(b) LFPR
NOTE: This figure plots the unemployment rate and the labor force participation rate among young and
prime-aged people. “Young people” refers to those individuals who are between 18 and 24 years of age, and
“prime-aged individuals” are those between 25 and 54 years of age. Data source: Current Population Survey.
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(b) Estimates for the impact conditional on year and month fixed effects
NOTE: Panel A of this figure plots the disconnection rate among young people aged 18 to 24 from 2018 to
2020 by month. Panel B shows the estimated impact of the pandemic on disconnection rate by month and
the associated 95 percent confidence interval. The estimation equation is given by Equation 1. We use the
data between 2015 and 2020 for the estimation.
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(a) School
Full-time Work (>=35 hours)









Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
(b) Work
NOTE: This figure plots the impact of the pandemic on the share of young people in school (Panel A) or at
work (Panel B) by month. For these two subfigures, we construct four mutually exclusive states: full-time
work, school, part-time work, and disconnection. In the case of ties, we use the following ordering: full-time
work > school > part-time work > disconnection.
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(c) By age group
NOTE: This figure shows the impact of the pandemic on disconnection rate by race, gender, and age groups.
The estimation equation is given by Equation 1. We use the data between 2015 and 2020 for the estimation.
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Figure 5: 2019–2020 Changes in Disconnection Rate by State (leaving out summer months)
ME -2%

















































NOTE: This figure plots the percentage-point change in the disconnection rate from 2019 to 2020 by state.
The change in the disconnection rate is calculated using data between January and December, leaving out
summer months.
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Figure 6: Disconnection, school, and work rates and the national unemployment rate for the















































































Note: These figures plot the share of young people disconnected (panel A), in school (panel B), and at work
(panel C). Summer months are excluded when calculating these rates. In each figure, trends for the civilian
unemployment rate are added as dashed lines. The unemployment rate is calculated by the BLS, and it
includes civilians above 16. Unemployment rate data are from the BLS data finder.
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Figure 7: Disconnection Rate and National Unemployment Rate by Gender for the 2007




























































1990 2000 2010 2020
Survey year
(b) Females
NOTE: This figure shows disconnection rate by gender. Summer months are excluded when calculating
these rates. National unemployment rate from the BLS is plotted in dashed lines.
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Appendices
A Tables and Figures
Table A1: Transition Matrix from Original Data
Panel A: 2018–2019
Disconn. PT Work School FT Work Missing
Disconn. 0.336 0.057 0.081 0.118 0.408
School 0.059 0.048 0.440 0.143 0.311
PT Work 0.077 0.206 0.059 0.289 0.370
FT Work 0.031 0.036 0.053 0.485 0.395
Panel B: 2019–2020 Difference (p.p./percent)
Disconn. PT Work School FT Work Missing
Disconn. 0.025 -0.011 -0.006 -0.010 0.002
7.4% -18.3% -7.5% -8.7% 0.4%
School 0.018 -0.001 -0.003 -0.040 0.026
31.4% -2.1% -0.6% -28.3% 8.2%
PT Work 0.056 -0.028 0.060 -0.125 0.037
73.2% -13.7% 102.6% -43.2% 9.9%
FT Work 0.039 0.007 0.008 -0.069 0.014
125.6% 19.8% 15.0% -14.2% 3.6%
NOTE: This table reports the raw transition probabilities. The rows represent the
starting states, and the columns represent the destination states. For Panel A, the
numbers in each row add up to one. The missing category includes those respondents
who were not reinterviewed and those respondents whose status was undetermined.
Panel B reports the change in the transition probabilities. Percentage-point changes
are reported in black, and percentage changes are in blue.
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Figure A1: Disconnection Rate by State (2019)
ME 16%

















































NOTE: This map plots the disconnect rate in 2019 by state. The disconnection rate is calculated using data between January
and December, but excluding summer months.
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NOTE: This figure shows the percentage changes in employment among young people by major industry
categories. The numbers are calculated using data from April to December in 2019 and 2020.
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Survey year
(b) Females
NOTE: This figure shows disconnection rates by gender and race for the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic and the
2007 recession. The national unemployment rate from the BLS is plotted in dashed lines.
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Survey year
(d) Work (females)
NOTE: In this figure, we plot the trends in the share of young people in school or at work by gender.
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NOTE: This figure shows the percentage change in employment from 2006 to 2010 among young people by major industry
categories. The changes are calculated using data from all the months in both years.
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